Theory suggests that three factors -the importance of ideology to primary voters, costly movement due to candidate reputations and lack of competition -all contribute to candidate divergence in US congressional elections. These predictions are analysed with new data from a 2000 mail survey that asked congressional candidates to place themselves on a left-right ideological scale. The data reveal that candidates often diverge, but that the degree of candidate polarization is variable and may be explained by factors in the theory. Candidates with firm public reputations, those who face weak general election competition, and those who experience stiff primary competition are all more likely to deviate from the median voter's position. Perhaps more importantly, the locations that candidates adopt have clear effects on their vote shares.
requirement that candidates and parties 'formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies'. 9 Divergence will of course be enhanced to the degree that candidates have different views of what constitutes good public policy, yet it would be all the more striking if divergence could be induced within rather than without Downs's framework.
I propose a theory of candidate positioning that moves towards a more realistic prediction of 'moderate extremism' while reconnecting the formal and empirical literatures on American elections. It holds true to the fundamental assumption that candidates are motivated by re-election and that the median voter exerts real centripetal pull. But it also recognizes that candidates are often hindered in their movement to the centre and tend to be characterized by limited mobility. I argue that three major factors contribute to candidate differences, and thus the differences between theory and evidence. Though these three influences are not exhaustive, they capture important differences between formal and empirical understandings of candidate positioning at the level of generality that models are typically applied. Incorporating these ideas makes theoretical sense, allows for candidates to diverge without discarding the assumption that candidates are office-seeking, and generates testable empirical predictions. These three factors are as follows.
First, real-world elections are most likely to adhere to theoretical predictions when the assumptions required by spatial models are met. The most important of these is parity in competition. Congressional elections seldom meet this standard. Roughly three in twenty House races go uncontested altogether and many others heavily favour one candidate, often the incumbent. Only a small fraction of races are genuinely competitive in the sense that spatial models assume.
Much of the time the dominant candidate need not worry terribly much about the policy preferences of voters. His 'non-policy' advantages in skill, name recognition, campaign resources and stylistic fit with the district tend to overwhelm voters' ideological considerations. The literature on congressional elections shows that non-policy advantages like these are great enough to scare away strong opponents. 10 In many cases the weaker candidate does not even have a large enough endowment to convey a persuasive message to the median voter. In short, lack of parity in the non-policy qualities of candidates will allow for more policy divergence, with the favoured candidate having the luxury of remaining distant from the median voter.
11 (F'note continued) Secondly, primary voters exert strong centrifugal pulls on candidates.
12 Nearly all candidates in the United States are required to run in two elections to win office: a primary and a general. A primary election is an intraparty contest that selects a nominee to run against other nominees in the general election. Because primary voters are often partisan diehards who care a great deal about policy positions, they prefer candidates with non-centrist positions. Candidates are likely to face a tension between extreme primary voters and relatively moderate general election voters. 13 While some formal approaches have recognized this candidate dilemma, the models tend to allow candidates to have policy motivations or prohibit candidates from shifting between the primary and general elections.
14 Importantly, we suspect that primary activists and general election voters use different mixes of criteria in choosing candidates. The ideological positions of candidates are simply more important to primary voters than to general election voters. It is probably true that most candidates would be moderate if ideological positions were all that mattered in general elections, but they are not. Positions matter in both kinds of elections, but primary voters are expected to weigh ideological purity more heavily. Candidates can find other non-policy ways to appeal to general election voters whose concerns focus on criteria that are less ideological.
Thirdly, candidate movement is limited and costly. 15 Candidates have reputations that cannot be easily discarded. Unlike Hinich and Munger's hypothetical hot-dog vendors moving freely along a boardwalk to maximize sales, candidates and parties may not change positions often without penalty. Even if they have no personal convictions, jumping from one location to another could turn off voters. Voters like candidates who are near them spatially but they also prefer candidates who stand their ground. In short, movement should be minimal.
More useful than acknowledging relocation costs themselves is realizing that these costs are not even the same for all candidates. Public officials have reputations that constrain their movement. They become more immobile the more that these reputations are made concrete. All else constant, for example, we would expect incumbents to incur more costs for shifting positions than would challengers. If nothing else, their roll-call records tie them concretely to sets of issue positions. 16 Movement is costly because is raises uncertainty that voters have about a candidate. 17 Dramatic or sudden shifting from one position to another is likely to be criticized as 'flip-flopping', 'waffling' or indecision by an interest group, the media or an opponent and will usually be exacted in electoral punishment by voters. While substantial moderation might make a candidate closer to the median voter, the shifting itself raises some non-policy questions about the candidate's reputation that can be equally damaging. As a result, most candidates will make only small changes in their locations. The three parts of this theoretical account explain why candidates tend to diverge rather than converge as spatial models predict. And it does so without violating the key assumption that politicians are driven by election rather than their own policy goals. The theory has a number of empirical implications that are amenable to testing. Unlike many critics of traditional spatial models, I believe that ideological positions can matter a great deal in elections and that the fundamental logic of the classic spatial model remains powerful.
This theoretical account produces a number of predictions. At a fundamental level, it suggests that the degree to which candidates' positions matter varies and is explainable. Voters can only vote ideologically when the candidates take differing stands. Ideology thus becomes a more important criterion in the voting calculus when candidates adopt distinct platforms. 18 Candidates rarely converge, but convergence will be approximated more closely when the candidates are of similar strengths, when candidates' reputations are ambiguous, and when primary voters do not have much pull. Put another way, the predictions of spatial models are most accurate when real world elections approximate their assumptions.
19 But even in these situations, candidates will sometimes diverge. The joint effects of unequal competition, the centrifugal pull of primaries and costly movement ensure that 'moderate extremism' is the norm.
E S T I M A T I N G C A N D I D A T E S ' P O S I T I O N S
The litmus test for any formal theory lies in its predictive ability. Spatial theories are particularly difficult to test, however, because of the absence of adequate data. Measuring candidate ideology is especially challenging. The fundamental empirical problem is that candidate positions are unobservable. As a result, proxy measures must be used. Researchers have produced a plethora of ideological measures for incumbents using sources such as roll-call votes, newspaper reports or constituent surveys. Some researchers have managed to interview legislators directly, either in person or by self-administered survey.
20 Unfortunately, few of these studies place incumbents and non-incumbents on the 19 I wish to work within the traditional spatial modelling framework precisely to demonstrate how it can be compatible with empirical work on elections. Thus, I do not wish to challenge such common assumptions as single-peaked preferences, proximity voting and unidimensionality. I also avoid the debate between advocates of proximity and directional models, noting only that directional models are better able to explain candidate divergence; the two models are difficult to distinguish empirically even if they are reconciled theoretically (Jeffrey Lewis and Gary King, 16 (1991) , 375-92; Eric R. A. N. Smith, Richard Herrera and Cheryl L. Herrera, 'The Measurement Characteristics of Congressional Roll-Call Indexes', Legislative same ideological scale using the same method to ensure comparability. 21 Rarely do non-incumbents engage in parallel behaviours that generate quantifiable ideological indicators.
The common practice of using measures that exist only for incumbents probably understates the role of positioning in congressional elections, leading to the mistaken conclusion that such contests are non-ideological. There are at least three reasons for this. First, if the candidate is the unit of analysis, omitting challenger information results in selection bias. Candidates come in two rather different types: incumbent and nonincumbent. Though several reasonable ideological measures have been developed for incumbents, 22 challengers have been largely neglected. Secondly, and relatedly, many election theories posit that the relative distances of the candidates from each other and voters are important. With only one of the candidates' positions measured, it is difficult to reach valid inferences about the net effects of candidate positions on vote choice. Thirdly, research on congressional elections finds that the challenger characteristics, whether considered in terms of 'quality' or other criteria, are the main variables that determine elections. 23 Incumbents are a relatively homogeneous lot, being more experienced, more familiar to constituents, financially advantaged and more moderate than their opponents. Their electoral fortunes are shaped mostly by the nature of the candidates who challenge them. Thus, neglecting the positions that non-incumbents adopt misses the variation that has made congressional elections of such interest to a large community of scholars.
D A T A A N D A P P R O A C H
The 2000 Candidate Ideology Survey (CIS) was developed in an effort to generate suitable data for testing the broad theoretical expectations drawn above. The project's design is simple. A mail survey was sent to every major party candidate for Congress just before (F'note continued) Studies Quarterly, 15 (1990) the 2000 election. The sample includes all running incumbents, their challengers, open-seat candidates, senators who are not up for re-election and incumbents running for another office, though only the House candidate data are analysed here.
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The CIS mailing asked only one question: where the candidate is located on the left-right ideological spectrum. Using a wording similar to that employed by the National Election Study, candidates were asked to place themselves directly on a unidimensional scale running from 0 (strong liberal) to 100 (strong conservative). Using self-placement to measure candidates' locations is imperfect, but it solves more problems than it creates. There will be considerable noise in any measure of ideology; the CIS data are no different. For example, one factor determining a candidate's response is which staff member in the office completes the survey. 26 In addition, there will be some disconnection between what a candidate says on the campaign trail and her or his response to the survey. But these troubles are outweighed by the advantages: having comparable estimates of both challenger and incumbent positions that are not a function of the roll-call agenda or other factors outside the candidate's control. The CIS responses are perhaps the best summary of how a candidate wishes to be perceived by voters.
An attraction of the data is their face validity. The self-placements of candidates fit nicely with common stereotypes about where they are located. The average Democrat is located significantly left of centre at 38.1, while Republicans are even further to the right at 78.3. Democrats are also more heterogeneous than Republicans with a standard deviation of 19.3 compared to Republicans ' 13.3. 27 Candidates of both parties who are from the South are more conservative and less heterogeneous too. The typical southern Democrat is a moderate 45.1, while southern Republicans average a conservative 81.7 and have a tight standard deviation of 10.9. Figure 1 shows the distributions of positions adopted by candidates of each party in the form of kernel density plots. As other work has shown, party differences are rather distinct in contemporary US politics. 28 Democrats remain more diverse than Republicans by disbursing themselves all along the dimension, but the fact remains that the Democrats tend to cluster on the left and Republicans on the right. Though national polarization is due in part to variations in district preferences, polarization is even common on a district-bydistrict basis. In cases where data on both candidates' positions exist, the average gap between them is a sizable 36.2, just over one-third of the entire scale. If one could quantify Merrill and Grofman's 'moderate extremism', one suspects it would be roughly of this magnitude.
Though party polarization is a regular occurrence today, and is consistent with the theory developed here, Figure 1 leaves many important questions unanswered. In particular, how are candidates' positions within the same district related? And how do candidates' locations correspond with district preferences? The theoretical approach taken here expects both relationships to be positive though highly variable, depending on other election characteristics, particularly competitiveness. 25 Details of the survey may be found in the Appendix to the website version of this article. 26 I have some evidence that this problem is minor. Because all candidates received the mailing twice, some actually responded twice. In many cases the answer was exactly the same; in only one case did the answers differ by more than 10 points on the 101-point scale.
27 Bernard Grofman, Samuel Merrill, Thomas L. Brunell and William Koetzle, 'The Potential Electoral Disadvantages of a Catch-All Party', Party Politics, 5 (1999), 199-210; William G. Mayer, The Divided Democrats: Ideological Unity, Party Reform, and Presidential Elections (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996) . 28 Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Fig. 1. Distributions of House candidate positions
Opposing candidates' positions are indeed positively related to one another, correlating at a significant if meagre 0.21 (p Ͻ 0.01).
29 This is far from what standard theory would expect. Consider a standard model of full candidate convergence. When viewed cross-sectionally, it should produce a correlation 1.0 since candidates adopt exactly the same position within each district. At least this would be true at the tail end of the campaign. But if we view the survey as capturing one point in a dynamic back-and-forth campaign over time, the correlation ought to be strongly negative. Moderation by one candidate will encourage counter-moderation by the other in an attempt to move the cut line in the opposite direction. As candidates alternately move towards the centre, higher Democratic values are associated with lower Republican ones, thus a negative correlation. Either way, the modest positive correlation suggests that more is going on than candidates rushing to the median voter's location.
More evidence for this assertion is found in Figure 2 , which plots candidates' positions by the share of the vote won by George W. Bush in each district in the 2000 presidential election. 30 The lines running through the two sets of dots are locally smoothed (loess) 29 This positive relationship is a remarkably robust one found elsewhere: Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 'Candidate Positioning in US House Elections'; Charles H. Franklin, 'Words and Deeds: Not-So-Cheap Talk in US Senate Campaigns, 1988-1992' (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 1995); Erikson and Wright, 'Voters, Candidates, and Issues in Congressional Elections'. 30 The Bush vote is used since it corresponds to the CIS ratings where higher values indicate more conservative positions. Note that while presidential vote shares and candidate ratings both range from 0 to 100, they are not necessarily on the same scale. Correlational analysis can be conducted to analyse relationships but one should be hesitant to compute distances using two measures that are on different metrics. Because of these methodological 31 It affirms on the one hand that full convergence is rare, yet on the other hand the centripetal pull of district electorates plays a role in anchoring candidates' locations. Candidate and constituent preferences are positively and significantly related to one another. The degree of this connection is apparently stronger for Democrats than Republicans, if only because Republicans adopt a more narrow range of positions.
Several conclusions can be drawn immediately from this examination of the raw data. First, the candidate locations have face validity and seem to fit with our general understandings of American politics. Nearly all Republicans are to the right of centre and Democrats are mostly, though not exclusively, to the left. This creates a relatively polarized party politics both nationally and at the district level. Divergence, however, varies greatly across districts and might depend more on Democratic candidate positions since the (F'note continued) issues and the theoretical focus of this article, the only distances analysed below are between candidates rather than between candidates and voters. Democratic party is known to be more heterogeneous. Centripetal forces play a clear role in determining candidate locations but centrifugal forces seldom give in to them entirely.
E X P L A I N I N G C A N D I D A T E D I V E R G E N C E
Candidates would prefer to campaign by doing things other than changing their positions. Moderation is only a last-ditch response to electoral panic. Candidates who face strong opponents are more likely to look towards the centre to minimize their chances of defeat. In contrast, candidates who face token opposition and are strong in other, non-policy ways have the freedom to maintain their relatively extreme positions. At the same time, the strongest candidates also face the greatest constraints because their reputations and visibility limit the amount to which they can relocate. This is the irony for the advantaged candidate. All of these motivations to move will of course be heavily tempered by inertia. Movement generally occurs on the margins of electoral competition.
Fitting with the reputational story, incumbents running for re-election were more extreme than the challengers who opposed them, a result directly contradicting Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart. Among Republican candidates, the mean incumbent locates at 79.2 and the mean challenger at 76.0. Democratic incumbents average 35.6 while Democratic challengers are at 43.2. Democratic incumbents thus appear more liberal and Republican incumbents more conservative than their challengers (both differences statistically significant at p Ͻ 0.05). Apparently challengers who are disadvantaged in terms of resources and name recognition offer moderate positions in an attempt to compensate for their non-policy liabilities. Incumbents incur more costs for moving but also conveniently feel less need to do so. Candidates who run uncontested are 4.4 points more extreme. This leads to the conclusion that in many districts the winning candidate is actually further from the centre than the loser, but manages victory on the basis of non-ideological criteria that overwhelm the modest effects of ideological proximity.
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Multivariate analysis is of course required to sort out these and other issues with greater certainty.
There are enough centrifugal forces at work in American politics such that candidates will resist moderation until stiff competition makes it too compelling to withstand. Because congressional elections are often one-sided affairs, non-centrist positions are common. At the same time, my theory suggests that more than the lack of competition alone is responsible for the degree to which candidates offer voters real choices.
The theory offered here suggests that only a combination of factors -primaries, limited candidate mobility and lack of competition -contribute to candidate divergence. As competition increases, primaries become less important and candidates are freer to adopt new positions. As a result, convergence becomes more likely. In the end, the data show that candidates differ greatly in some districts but not much in others, with 'moderate extremism' as an adequate description for the typical race.
To examine these factors simultaneously, I estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model where the dependent variable is the difference between candidates' positions. As noted earlier, this gap ranges from 0 (complete convergence) to 100 (maximum divergence) and averages around 36 points. Two models are specified: one for the Democrat-Republican comparison and another for the challenger-incumbent comparison. The partisan model represents the conventional Downsian way of thinking. The secondary focus on challengers and incumbents is more reflective of the recent empirical literature on congressional elections.
Candidate quality, proxied by experience in elective office, is used to tap reputational limits on mobility. I suggested above that stronger candidates have more leeway in positioning, so one might expect high-quality candidates to diverge more. And experienced candidates have more concrete reputations that make movement costlier. However, any divergent movement will be limited by reputational constraints and the position of one's opponent. 33 The 'quality' of each party's nominee is assessed using Jacobson's standard indicator as to whether the candidate has held previous elective office. 34 Jacobson has shown that this simple dummy variable captures most of the relevant differences between formidable and weak challengers. Note that incumbents are always of high quality by this definition.
In the partisan model, I expect that the difference in candidate quality is the conceptual variable of interest and so include a dummy indicating whether one candidate has a quality advantage over the other (i.e., one has held office, the other has not). If both are experienced or inexperienced, the variable takes on the value of zero. The more imbalanced is the competition on non-policy grounds, theory suggests that candidate divergence will be greater. In the challenger-incumbent model, the variable indicates whether the challenger is experienced or not.
Constituent preferences are measured with the 2000 Gore vote, squared to allow for a non-linear relationship between voter ideology and candidate distance.
35 I expect the gap between candidates to be smallest in the most competitive districts. This is a rough indicator of the centripetal forces at work in general elections.
The measure of centrifugal force is the competitiveness of the candidates' primary elections. This is a dummy variable indicating when both candidates faced more than token opposition in a primary (greater than 10 per cent of the vote). Recall from the theory outlined here that only modest levels of competition are required in a primary to encourage candidates to move outwards because of the heavier weight that primary voters place on their positions. The theory expects a positive effect of primary competitiveness on candidate divergence.
The results, reported in Table 1 , are supportive on two counts. 36 First, non-policy differences between candidates shape the degree to which they offer distinct platforms. When one candidate is high quality and the other is low, candidates diverge about 7.5 points more than when quality is equalized.
Secondly and more importantly, contested primaries do pull candidates apart. The presence of anything more than a fringe opponent in the party primaries increases the 33 The relationship between Democratic and Republican quality is actually negative (r ϭ Ϫ 0.61) because most races feature an incumbent (who is experienced by definition) against an inexperienced challenger. The relationship appears positive but is not significant in open seats (r ϭ 0.17, p ϭ 0.16).
34 Descriptions of candidates' backgrounds are taken from Roll Call and candidates' campaign websites. The measure closely approximates Gary Jacobson's assessments of candidate experience drawn from slightly different sources. 35 Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 'Candidate Positioning in US House Elections.' 36 The small share of variance explained is of some concern. It should be noted, however, that that dependent variable contains substantial variation due to the locations of two candidates being included in a single measure. When models are estimated predicting where one candidate is positioned, the adjusted R 2 quickly jumps to between 0.3 and 0.4. distance between candidates by some 10 points. It is worth pointing out that this rather straightforward effect is precisely the opposite of that in Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart's analysis. They argue, counterintuitively, that the space between candidates is actually smaller when primaries are competitive. This analysis suggests instead that competitive intraparty competition has a modest centrifugal effect. In the end it seems that primaries draw candidates outwards in ways that most general elections cannot entirely reverse. This finding fortunately fits with the theory offered here. Candidates are often firmly rooted to their policy reputations and would prefer not to change their positions dramatically. Sometimes, however, stiff competition -particularly at the primary stage -forces them to move in a more noticeable way. But because primary voters weigh candidates' locations more heavily in their voting calculi than do general election voters, the polarizing effects of primaries are seldom entirely offset by the moderating tendencies of the general election campaign.
T H E C O N S E Q U E N C E S O F C A N D I D A T E P O S I T I O N I N G
Standard models of congressional elections posit that outcomes are heavily determined by the relative qualities of the candidates, namely experience, resources and incumbency. District characteristics matter too of course, though they are sometimes reflected more in who runs than who wins. The discussion above argued that a key variable omitted from such analyses is ideology. Such omissions usually happen for pragmatic rather than theoretical reasons. When ideological indicators are included, they typically exist only for the incumbent, thus creating a selection bias that understates the role of ideology. As a result, the importance of other variables is likely to be overstated. 37 Burden, 'Candidates' Positions in Congressional Elections'.
Using some of the same variables as above, I develop a model to explain candidates' vote shares. The CIS data are included along with a common if parsimonious set of predictors drawn from the literature on congressional elections. I again model these first in partisan terms and then with respect to incumbency.
Most of the non-ideological variables capture the strengths or resources of the candidates, the kinds of factors that are typically included in House election models. As in the partisan model above, a relative measure of candidate quality in included. The difference here is that the variable is directional. It takes on three possible values: ϩ 1 (when only the Democrat is experienced), 0 (when candidate experience is the same), or Ϫ 1 (when only the Republican is experienced). Higher values thus indicate a larger quality advantage for the Democrat.
This definition of course misses some strong candidates, particularly those with substantial wealth who can overcome a simple lack of name recognition.
38 I compensate by including several measures of campaign spending. Campaign disbursements are a proxy for the power and extent of a candidate's message. Much campaign money is spent on advertising, so this creates a strong relationship between the amount spent and message saturation. In addition, journalists portray candidates who raise more money as more credible and provide them with more unpaid coverage. 39 For now spending is measured as the Democratic share of total expenditures by both candidates. 40 Finally, a control for the preferences of district voters is measured using Gore's share of the two-party vote in 2000. I expect that the Democratic share of the vote increases when the Democratic candidate is of higher quality, with more Democratic spending, and as the district becomes more liberal.
I include the CIS ideology data by computing the midpoint between opposing candidates in each district. 41 In step with standard spatial models, one would expect the Democratic share of the vote to rise as this cut line moves rightwards, thus creating a larger number of voters closer to the Democrat than the Republican. This measure is available in 153 contested House districts. 42 The linear regression results in Table 2 remind us of the importance of candidate status and strength variables. The gap in candidate experience has a detectable effect. The coefficient of 2.12 suggests that an experienced candidate earns a bonus of more than 2 points over an inexperienced opponent. If the candidates were to swap backgrounds the vote swing would be more than 4 points (2 ϫ 2.12 ϭ 4.24) in the direction of the experienced candidate. Spending also matters a great deal: as the Democratic share of spending rises by 3 percentage points, the Democrat's vote percentage increases by almost 9 points (0.03 ϫ 2.89). This does not necessarily imply that money buys votes but rather that stronger candidates -those with more resources and thus who reach more voters with their messages -tend to do better. In addition to these important non-policy factors, candidates' positions play a consistent role in shaping the outcomes of elections. As the cutting line moves rightwards by 20 points, the Democrat's share of the vote rises by about 2 percentage points. Thus, one can safely conclude that ideology 'matters'. 43 Recent comparative research similarly finds that candidates can reasonably affect their vote shares by several points by adopting different positions, even at the presidential level and in other industrial democracies. 44 Though modest effects like these do not matter much in the typical lopsided House election, they can easily determine who wins a competitive seat. If one defines 'marginal' districts as those where the winner takes less than 60 per cent of the two-party vote, then almost one in four races meets that standard in 2000. It is in these districts -where much of the representational action occurs and the standard spatial model is most immediately applicable -that the policy positions of candidates matter most. One might suspect that moderation is more common in these races too, however, leading to the ironic situation where the clarity of candidate differences is smallest in the contests where voters have the best opportunity to send signals about their preferences.
Though it shows that candidate positions do indeed influence election outcomes, the analysis in Table 2 does not speak much to the large empirical literature on congressional elections, which thinks of races more in terms of incumbent versus challenger than Democrat versus Republican. The great asymmetries of name recognition, experience and resources require one to reconsider the model in these terms. I do this by re-estimating the regression, changing the dependent variable from the percentage won by the Democrat to the percentage of the vote won by the challenger.
Several explanatory variables are modified as well. In addition to viewing spending as a ratio of the strengths of campaign messages, challenger and incumbent disbursements are entered separately in Specification I since the former are known to have more impact than the latter. 45 Disbursements are also measured as a single variable in Specification II using the ratio of challenger spending to total spending. Candidate quality is now measured as one variable indicating whether the challenger has held elective office (since incumbents are all experienced by this definition). And rather than a measure of district preferences based on partisanship, I now include Perot's 1996 vote share in the district as a rough indicator of the anti-incumbent orientations of voters. All else constant, districts giving Perot more support are probably also more likely to support a challenger rather than an incumbent.
The results in Table 3 fit with both the existing empirical literature and the standard spatial framework. On the one hand, the power of incumbency is threatened only when challengers are experienced or spend heavily. On the other hand, the relative ideological locations of the candidates also seem to matter. As expected, spending has important effects. The share of total spending incurred by the challenger's campaign surely matters (Specification II), but it appears to be driven more by the amount the challenger spends than the amount the incumbent spends. All else equal too, an experienced challenger can expect to earn about 3 more percentage points of the vote than an inexperienced challenger.
Explaining Challenger Vote Shares Perot support is associated with challenger votes too, hinting that districts that support minor-party presidential candidates harbour more general anti-incumbent sentiment as well. Most importantly, the locations of candidates have a direct bearing on election outcomes. Shifting the midpoint 15 points towards the incumbent gets the challenger roughly 1.2 percentage points more of the vote. A dramatic shifts of 30 points, which is perhaps more reasonable for challengers with less restrictive reputations, can add 2 to 3 points to their vote totals. Note that the effect in Table 3 is a bit smaller than in Table 2 , suggesting that the asymmetry between incumbents and challengers dampens the effects of positioning slightly, as the theory would expect.
The main point to take away from this section is that candidates' positions have demonstrable effects on their vote shares. This runs against work on congressional elections arguing that they are non-ideological. Yet it is clear that House elections are not solely or even mostly driven by ideological positioning, even in the most ideologically extreme districts.
C O N C L U S I O N
This investigation has yielded several findings that can help researchers hoping to reconcile the differences between formal models and empirical studies of American elections. In general, the logic of candidate convergence works in the real world elections best when competition is fiercest. The proximity voting decisions of the electorate weigh more heavily on a candidate's behaviour when he or she faces a strong opponent. It is the nature of the competition that determines how closely a candidate hews to public sentiment. The stronger a candidate, however, the less apt he or she is to moderate her or his positions in advance of the general election because of reputational constraints.
This result is contrary to work arguing that competition actually produces polarization. 46 Perhaps these contradictory findings derive from different definitions of competitiveness. It is also likely that spurious factors are at work. Primary electorates happen to be more divergent in competitive districts because of stronger and more oppositional political parties, thus inducing a more complicated relationship between measures of competitiveness and polarization. 47 Policy differences are far more frequent than divergence, as predicted by the theoretical account outlined here, would expect. Often both centripetal and centrifugal forces are at work in a district; oddly enough, their impacts apparently rise and fall together.
The median voter is always looming and thus explains the great power that centripetal forces have on American electoral politics in the broadest view. But the convergence prediction assumes that only positions matter when they are in fact but one force among many. They matter more when real elections approximate modelling assumptions and matter less as elections become less competitive. Candidates tend to emerge from primaries as relative extremists and seldom moderate much during the general election campaign. The general lack of mobility makes the causes and effects of positioning all the more dramatic.
Abundant resources, relevant campaign experience and the like are great advantages that provide some leeway in position adoption. At the same time, public figures such as incumbents have less room to manoeuvre because of their strong reputations. Thus, candidate strength often has dual effects on moderation. The most formidable candidates worry least about appealing to the centre and have little leeway to relocate anyway. Many incumbents are likely to have got to office in the first place because they fitted the constituency better than their opponents did. As a result, even the most insulated incumbents are unlikely to deviate too far from voter preferences. Primaries, and the limits on spatial mobility that plague most public officials, pull candidates outwards. Because primary voters are better informed, are more extreme and care more about ideology than do general election voters, their centrifugal force is a continuing one in US elections. Using a new dataset based on candidates' self-placements, I show that a relatively simple theory of two-party elections is quite capable of explaining empirical reality.
